Agent Defense: runtime governance for AI agent fleets

Your agents hold credentials and act on real systems. Control what they are allowed to do, and keep the proof.

Candor Agent Defense sits between your agents and the systems they act on. Every action is checked twice before it runs: is this agent who it claims and acting within what it was granted, and is the action itself dangerous. High-impact actions wait for a person. A compromised supervisor loses its whole delegation tree in one step. Every decision is written to a hash-chained record your auditor can verify.

Every capability on this page is tied to a dated test record. Where we have not tested something, the page says so.

The enterprise problem

A fleet fails differently from a single agent.

One agent with one job is a model-quality problem. Tens of agents that spawn other agents, pass work between them and hold credentials to business systems are an authority problem. The questions a security or risk owner has to answer are about who was allowed to do what, on whose authority, and what happens when one of them is compromised.

Delegation

Authority spreads down a tree

A supervisor agent hands scope to workers. If the supervisor is compromised, every agent acting on its delegation is acting on bad authority, even if each one looks healthy on its own.

Credentials

Agents carry real access

An agent that can read a credential store, call a payment API or send mail as the company is a principal in your environment. It needs an identity that can be verified and revoked like one.

Accountability

Someone will ask what happened

After an incident, an auditor, a regulator or the board asks for the record. A log that could have been edited afterwards does not answer that question.

How it is built

Two planes, kept separate on purpose.

Identity and authority are decided in one place. The safety of the action is decided in another. Neither plane can stand in for the other, and an action has to pass both.

Authority plane

Who is acting, and on what grant

Issues each agent’s identity and credential, records who delegated what to whom, checks every action against the authority actually granted, holds high-impact actions for a human, and revokes authority for one agent or a whole delegation tree.

Behavioral plane

Is this action dangerous

Evaluates the action itself at the point of execution. A dangerous action is contained at the engine: the agent is quarantined and every further action from it is refused until an operator reviews it.

The join between the two is where fleet incidents show up. A harmless-looking action from a forged credential is a finding. So is a correctly credentialed agent attempting something dangerous. A single filter in front of a model sees neither clearly.

What it does at runtime

The controls, in the order an incident needs them.

Before the action

Identity and authority check

Every agent presents a credential. Forged, reused or missing credentials are refused. The action is compared with the authority that agent was granted.

Before the action

Human hold on high impact

An action marked high impact does not run on the agent’s say. It is escalated, a named person allows or denies it, and that approval can be used once.

During the action

Containment at the engine

A dangerous action, such as an attempt to exfiltrate credentials, is stopped and the agent is quarantined. Every further action from it is refused.

During an incident

One-step tree revocation

Declare a supervisor compromised and every agent in its delegation tree loses authority on both planes at once. A replacement generation comes up with fresh identities.

After an incident

Recovery is probation

A restored agent does not return to full trust. It has to complete ten consecutive clean actions. A medium-risk signal during probation contains it again.

Always

Observation mode and the ledger

Run both planes without blocking anything and record what each would have done. Reports are generated from the ledger, chain-verified first, with coverage gaps stated.

Evidence

Verified means run and recorded, with a date.

We do not list a capability because it is in the code. Each one below was exercised on our live range or deployed source, and the result was written to the same kind of hash-chained record a customer receives. The full table, with the test behind each line, is on the evidence page.

10 of 10agents in a delegation tree lost authority on both planes when the supervisor was declared compromised. 18 Sep 2026.
Under 3 minfor a replacement generation with fresh identities to be registered, deployed and passing health checks. 18 Sep 2026.
600consecutive governed evaluations with no degradation. 90th-percentile decision latency 2.4 seconds on the sovereign local model. 15 Sep 2026.
3,409ledger records chain-verified before the observation report was generated from them. 21 Sep 2026.
15 of 15egress probes blocked on both governance machines. The platform itself is sealed. 21 Sep 2026.
4 of 4runs identical when our red-team suite ran inside an NVIDIA OpenShell sandbox and natively. Tested compatible. 3 Oct 2026.
We run our own fleet under it. Candor’s ten-agent marketing and sales department operates under these controls. On 3 Oct 2026 it ran in a sealed sandbox (18 of 18 seal probes passed) and prepared ten outbound messages. Each one was held as a high-impact action until a named operator approved it, each approval was usable once, and the ledger verified intact afterwards.
We would rather show you a smaller true number than a larger claimed one.
Deployment

Where it sits in your estate.

Integration

At the point where agents act

Governed actions are sent for evaluation before they execute. Onboarding registers your agents from a roster or from discovery. Most engagements start without changing agent code.

Data

A sovereign model, no third party in the loop

Decisions are made by Candor’s own model on Candor-operated infrastructure. No third-party AI provider reads your agents’ actions. The ledger stores decisions and matched fragments, not full payloads.

Isolation

The governance platform is sealed

The machines that run the two planes have no egress except their private network. That is tested with probes, not asserted.

Sandbox runtimes

Works alongside agent sandboxes

A sandbox limits what an agent can reach. Agent Defense decides whether a specific action by a specific agent should run. Tested compatible with NVIDIA OpenShell: identical outcomes inside the sandbox and outside it.

Dedicated or on-premises deployment is available at the Enterprise tier and is scoped jointly.

What we do not claim

The limits, stated before you ask.

An enterprise buyer should know exactly where the verified ground ends. These are the items we have not yet exercised as tests. For larger estates they are part of the Assurance and Enterprise scope, and we test them with you.

How to start

Observe first. Enforce when the report says where.

Enforcement on a fleet you have not measured is guesswork. The first step is a fixed-price Discovery: we inventory the fleet, give every agent an identity, run both planes in observation mode and hand you a signed report of what would have been contained. The fee is credited in full if you proceed to enforcement within 30 days.

DiscoveryBest fitWindow and fee
LaunchFirst production agent or a single workflow.5 business days
$5,000
GrowthMultiple agents or several business systems.10 business days
$12,500
AssuranceRegulated or high-consequence environments.15 business days
$30,000
EnterpriseComplex estates, multiple regions, dedicated or on-premises deployment.Scoped
From $60,000
Details of the engagement are on the Discovery page.
Questions from security and platform teams

Before you bring us in

Is this a guardrail on the model?

No. It governs actions, not model output. The check happens where an agent tries to do something: call a tool, use a credential, send a message, change a record.

We already sandbox our agents. Why add this?

A sandbox sets the outer wall: what the agent could reach at all. Agent Defense decides, inside that wall, whether this agent is who it claims, whether this action is within its grant, and whether it should wait for a person. The two are complementary, and we have tested them together.

How much latency does a decision add?

In our endurance run the 90th-percentile decision latency was 2.4 seconds on the sovereign local model, across 600 consecutive evaluations. That figure is from our range. Yours is measured during Discovery.

Who approves a held action?

A named person, and the approval is recorded and usable once. The approval route for your organization is agreed during onboarding.

What happens to an agent after it is contained?

It stays contained until an operator restores it. A restored agent is on probation and must complete ten consecutive clean actions before it returns to normal.

How large a fleet has this been run on?

Our verified runs are at a ten-agent delegation tree. Larger populations are scoped under Assurance and Enterprise, with the population test as part of the engagement.

Tell us what your agents touch.

Roughly how many agents, where they run and which systems they act on. We will tell you which tier fits and what the first report would cover.

Talk to us about your fleet →